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In this paper, we assess the long-term stock price impact of 1327 cash dividend payment 
initiations and 1156 cash dividend payment omissions of firms listed on the NYSE and the 
NASDAQ, from 1972 to 2012. In particular we compare the annual returns of dividend initiating 
and omitting firms and firms that are equally likely to initiate (or omit). We find larger price 
effects during the years of cash dividend initiation and omission than is measured by earlier short 
period event studies, but we find no price impact after the year has elapsed. When measuring such 
long-run effects, contemporaneous (same year) determinants of price effects may confound the 
findings of pure dividend initiations or omissions. We therefore test whether there are also 
unexpected changes in the contemporaneous determinants of returns, and we find that risk 
measures and net income differ systematically between firms that initiate (or omit) and firms that 
have similar characteristics, but do not change their payout policy. When correcting for such 
effects we find that systematic risk does not influence concurrent returns in the years of initiations 
or omissions, though total risk does. Idiosyncratic risk changes only influence the returns after 
dividend omissions. With and without correction for ‘contemporaneous’ factors, we find –also for 
several robustness tests- that the one year price impact of initiations is larger than that of 
omissions, which suggests that the surprise effects of dividend omissions are on average smaller 
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When a firm initiates or omits a payment of a cash dividend, such a decision is a substantive 
alteration in corporate policy. This paper investigates the extent to which investors anticipate cash 
dividend initiations and omissions, and whether after correction for such expectations there remain 
excess annual stock price impacts of these events. We link anticipation about extreme cash 
dividend event candidates to the annual stock price impact using a difference-in-differences 
propensity score matching methodology. We also account for the importance of contemporaneous 
firm-level events.
1
 Our approach allows the identification of new information in the capital market 
which is originated by firm management by the extreme cash dividend events and also to assess 
the impact of such new information. 
There are typically positive value effects after initiations of cash dividends (Healy and Palepu, 
1988, Benartzi, Michaely, and Thaler, 1997, Boehme and Sorescu, 2002, and Charitou, 
Lambertides and Theodoulou, 2011). Relatively large negative value effects are documented after 
omissions of cash dividends (Healy and Palepu, 1988, Michaely, Thaler, and Womack, 1995, 
Benartzi, Michaely, and Thaler, 1997 and Liu, Szewczyk and Zantout, 2008).  The relatively large 
magnitude of the response to cash dividend omissions is usually related to the “the reluctance of 
managers to reduce dividends” (Michaely, Thaler, and Womack, 1995). A dividend omission 
announcement is, thus, arguably a bigger surprise to investors than a dividend initiation (Liu, 
Szewczyk and Zantout, 2008). In this paper, we study the capacity of investors to anticipate cash 
dividend initiations and omissions. Using firm propensities to extreme cash dividend events, we 
estimate the relative long-run equity stock market responses of those firms which conduct such 
events.   
Conjectured insight which endeavours to account for long-run price effects is three fold. First, 
dividend initiations and omissions can contain new information which makes these events similar 
to earnings surprises. We may, hence, expect comparable post-dividend announcement drift as e.g. 
Ball and Brown (1968), Bernard and Thomas (1990) and Chan, Jegadeesh and Lakonishok (1996) 
find for earnings. Second, with omissions, there can be over-reaction to the bad news contained 
within the investigated period and consequent mean reversion of returns as De Bondt and Thaler 
(1985, 1987) find for corporate losers in respect to their equity market performance. This latter 
approach provides reason to expect exactly the opposite pattern in prices after omissions, than is 
expected in the post-dividend announcement drift hypothesis.  Third, clientele effects can play an 
                                                          
1 Market price may not immediately reflect the full information content of events, but rather the information 
may impact prices over time. Our study, of long-run price impact, is thus related to the question of the 
informational efficiency of the market.  
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important role.  For instance, institutions may prefer cash dividend payments (because of the 
‘prudent man’ rules in their charter) while this may not be the case for private investors due to a 
(previous) taxation disadvantage of the dividend type of pay out (Black and Scholes 1974, and 
Shefrin and Statman, 1984). As a result, a gradual change in the stockholder clientele of the firm, 
after cash dividend initiations or omissions, may generate price drift (Shleifer, 1986), though the 
price pressure direction of a stockholder clientele effect is not clearly predictable in advance of an 
extreme cash dividend event.  
Michaely, Thaler and Womack (1995) study 561 dividend initiations and 887 dividend omissions 
from 1964 to 1988.  They focus on equally weighted returns and match on size and book-to-
market firm characteristics. They find short-run 3-day price reactions to omissions (7%) are 
greater than those for initiations (3%). In the post-announcement year a price drift in the same 
direction is evident, and is more pronounced after cash dividend omissions. Michaely, Thaler and 
Womack ascribe the larger effect of omissions to the higher information content of omissions. 
This is related to the well-known reluctance of managers to reduce dividends relative to their 
propensity to increase dividends. 
Fama (1998) highlights that informational inefficiency results, such as those reported in Michaely, 
Thaler and Womack (1995), may be due to chance, an incorrect statistical method or a mis-
specified expected return model. For the current paper it is in particular of importance that the best 
matching criteria should be used to test informational inefficiency and the existence of long-term 
stock price performance.  
Boehme and Sorescu (2002) respond to this call for additional rigour in statistical tests and 
inference. They study 2,886 cases of dividend initiations or resumptions 1927-1998 of firms listed 
on the NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ. In a direct response to the Fama (1998) paper, they use 
equal and value weighted returns and they extend the set of matching criteria used in Michaely, 
Thaler and Womack (1995) to also match on pre-announcement momentum in equity 
performance. They show that price drift is not robust across sub-samples and in the 1964 to 1988 
period is confined to small firms. The overall conclusion is that the Michaely, Thaler and Womack 
(1995) results may be simply due to chance. 
Turning to cash dividend omissions, Liu, Szewczyk and Zantout (2008) study 2,337 reduction/ 
omission announcements 1927-1999 of firms listed on the NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ. In 
response to the Fama (1998) paper, they also conduct improved testing and inference.  They use a 
Fama-French three factor model using OLS and WLS with respect to equal-weighted and value-
weighted calendar month event-portfolio returns.  Mean difference in stock price performance 
between dividend event and matched firms with seven different matching criteria. They find 
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negative 1-year post announcement abnormal returns. This is, however, driven by the post 
earnings announcement drift and skewness of buy-and-hold abnormal returns. Hence, they find no 
compelling evidence of post dividend event price drift. Again, it is suggested that the Michaely, 
Thaler and Womack (1995) results may be due to chance. 
In this paper, we also respond to Fama (1998) and we extend the studies of Boehme and Sorescu 
(2002) and Liu, Szewczyk and Zantout (2008). We “re-assess” the long-term value effects of 1327 
cash dividend payment initiations and 1156 cash dividend payment omissions of firms listed on 
the NYSE, AMEX and the NASDAQ and reporting in United States dollars, from 1972 to 2012. 
In the first instance, we investigate whether there is truly a greater surprise in the capital market in 
respect to omissions relative to initiations. We use a new counterfactual, which subsumes and 
improves on prior dimension-by-dimension matching, and thus allows new improved estimates of 
long-term price impacts. We, moreover, show that factors, like income and risk, do indeed change 
during the return measurement period. These factors may influence the estimates of the pure long-
run dividend initiation and dividend omission effects. We, thus, account for changes in income 
and risk measures, as well as other hypothesized factors, to account for cross sectional same time 
period value effects at these dividend events. 
To evaluate the cash dividend initiation short- and long-term stock price impact we adopt a 
matched difference-in-differences programme evaluation technique. Matching type difference-in-
differences programme evaluation techniques can, in specific circumstances, elicit consistent 
estimates of programme effects, even in the context of an endogenously determined event.
2
 In our 
setting, of an endogenously determined cash dividend initiation event, this event reveals to the 
capital market heretofore private information (i.e. on unobservable firm characteristics), on the 
part of the dividend initiating firm in respect to that firm management’s propensity to self-select to 
                                                          
2 The specific circumstances, to permit obtaining a consistent estimate of such a stock market value effect, 
necessitate, inter alia, a distinction between the decision makers who determine the event and those decision 
makers who determine the impact of that event. Invoking a semi strong form market efficiency assumption 
means that such a distinction is natural in the setting of a capital market impact of a corporate policy 
decision – such as a stock price response to a dividend initiation decision. Indeed, an information 
asymmetry argument, in line with the adjudicative intervention of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission’s trading restrictions between managers and capital market participants, is all that is necessary.  
 
The other assumptions which we invoke include (1) no reverse causality and that there is (2) no 
simultaneous news which may inform the dividend decision and the stock price behaviour and (3) no other 
corporate policy innovations which can account for the stock price behaviour. As the event and the stock 
market impact are observed chronologically in time we rule out the potential reverse causality source of 
bias.  In respect to (2) our counterfactual is selected to match the dividend initiating firm in respect to 
potential outcomes – matching on publicly available information. Finally, in our identification strategy we 





initiate a cash dividend payment. This new information can be of substantial value to market 
participants. For instance, it can convey information to the capital market concerning the phase of 
the financial life-cycle of the firm (Grullon, Michaely and Swaminathan, 2002, von Eije, Goyal 
and Muckley, 2014). The principal novelty of our approach is that we match not directly on 
expected stock returns, but rather, for statistical and economic reasons, on the propensity to the 
dividend initiation (or omission) event. Our approach subsumes and can improve on conventional 
matching approaches in the corporate finance literature. We, therefore, examine the price impact 
of these corporate policy decisions anew.  
Our main findings are twofold. First, we provide new price impact estimates. We find larger price 
effects during the years of cash dividend initiation and omission than is measured by short period 
event studies. Our propensity score matching (nearest neighbour) difference-in-differences 
findings suggest that the one year price impact of initiations is 19.1% and the one-year price 
decline of dividend omissions is 14.1%. Because these results exceed the daily abnormal returns 
measures calculated for such events earlier, it is clear that there must be other aspects that 
influence annual abnormal returns in the event year, amongst which price drift after the 
announcement, price run-up before the announcement, or contemporaneous changes of return 
determinants. We do not find further price impacts after the initiation or omission year has 
elapsed. After correction for within same year ‘contemporaneous’ factors, we show that the long 
run one year return impact of initiations is (surprisingly) still larger than that of omissions. 
Moreover, significant effects of annual dividend omissions are even absent if one applies the same 
method to firms with negative earnings in the year that preceeds the omission year. We therefore 
conclude that –contrary to the short-run effects measured in previous event studies, the surprise 
effect of dividend omissions is less on an annual basis than that of dividend initiations.  
Second, with respect to contemporaneous (same year) determinants of price effects we also 
provide new findings. First, we find that the difference-in-differences in systematic risk do not 
influence concurrent returns after initiations or omissions. Though, difference-in-differences in 
total risk is relevant. Second, difference-in-differences in idiosyncratic risk does influence the 
returns after dividend omissions. Finally, income, size and catering year effects (Baker and 
Wurgler, 2004), influence relative returns after cash dividend initiations and omissions. 
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we describe our sample data and our identification 





2. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
2.1  Data 
Our dataset comprises dividend payout initiations and omissions, from 1972 to 2012, of firms 
listed at the NASDAQ or the NYSE and reporting in United States dollars. We use the 
COMPUSTAT-CRSP linking table and select NYSE and NASDAQ firms with share codes 10 
and 11. Our principal payout variables are the actual initiations (omissions) of payouts of 
dividends. We require that dividend observations are available, though they may be zero. To 
correct for survivorship bias, our dataset comprises currently active and dead firms. We remove 
regulated utilities (codes 4900-4999) and financial firms (codes 6000-6999), firms with no fiscal 
year ends and firms without permanent company numbers. After this screen, we have 10,339 
firms. For these remaining firms, we download the daily returns and calculate the corresponding 
weekly (Wednesday) returns. The data are matched by date to the risk free rates, the Small Minus 
Big and the High Minus Low returns from the website of Kenneth French.
3
 We calculate the 
sample standard deviation of the excess weekly Wednesday returns as a measure of total risk. 
Then, we estimate, for each firm year, Fama and French (1993) Ordinary Least Squares 
regressions in the 52 week period preceding a fiscal year end. We calculate the sample standard 
deviation of the regression residuals to estimate the firm's idiosyncratic risk. The aggregate 
systematic risk is calculated as the square root of the difference between the squares of total and 
idiosyncratic risk. As a result, we obtain the annual sample estimates of weekly total, aggregate 
systematic and idiosyncratic risks. 
 
As a constraint to ensure stock liquidity, in each fiscal year, we require that there are not more 
than 5 zero weekly return observations and that there are at least 48 non-missing values for the 
weekly return observations. In addition, we retain observations only when the fiscal year end of 
the firm is more than a full year after the initial public offering (IPO), where an IPO is identified 
as the first day of non-zero prices in CRSP. This screening procedure leaves 7,740 firms and up to 
77,021 firm-year observations. 
 
2.2 Methodology 
In order to define the impact of an event – such as a cash dividend initiation – it is necessary to 
conceptualise a counterfactual scenario in respect to the event. A counterfactual scenario is one 
where all else is equal, but the ‘event’ does not take place. Then, the difference in the change in 
the outcome of interest (about the event), between event individuals and counterfactuals, is the 





impact of the event. A quintessential feature, thus, of a counterfactual is that its potential outcome, 
independent of the event of interest, is identical to that of the event individual. This is the 
conditional independence assumption or ‘strong ignorability’ result, with respect to confounding 
factors, of Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983). This rationale is central to the merit of a matched 
difference-in-differences programme evaluation technique.  
To operationalise this idea, in biomedical science, one frequently used mechanism is that the event 
is ascribed to the individual in an exogenous random process. This serves to preclude the dilemma 
of unobservable self-selection bias with respect to the measurement of the impact of the event. In 
contrast, unobservable self-selection bias can follow if the event is endogenous.
4
 Indeed, Li and 
Prabhala (2009) suggest that a matching methodology is ‘less plausible when the decision to 
choose an event is an endogenous choice of the decision maker, which is probably close to many 
corporate finance applications except perhaps for exogenous shocks such as regulatory changes.’  
Dividend initiation announcements are inherently endogenous events as their magnitude and 
timing is decided on by corporate management. We therefore qualify the Li and Prabhala (2009) 
caveat such that unobservable self-selection bias only follows if the event is endogenous and, 
critically, if the decision makers with respect to the event and those which determine the impact of 
that event, share, at least to some extent, a common membership. If there is distinct group 
membership across the decision makers, we can invoke a simple information asymmetry 
argument.
5
 In a dividend initiations setting, the information available to the set of decision makers 
who decide on the dividend initiation announcement can be expected to be different, than the 
information available to that set of capital market participants who will determine, by virtue of 
their trading decisions, the value impact of the dividend initiation announcement (Tanimura and 
Wehrly, 2012). The argument implies that due to Securities and Exchange Commission’s trading 
restrictions, the decision makers in respect to the cash dividend initiation event and the decision 
makers in the capital market have available different information – private and public, and only 
publicly available information, respectively. Thus, we adopt a solution which arises from a critical 
distinction between the estimation of an effect on an outcome which is, in part, determined by the 
decision makers at the firm (e.g. corporate policy change impact on corporate earnings) or which 
                                                          
4
 For instance, in the evaluation of the effect of a job training programme on participant’s earnings, self-
selection to the programme can arise due to unobservable participant traits (Lalonde, 1986). These 
unobservable traits can, by definition, not be matched (controlled for) across participant and counterfactual 
individuals. As a result, an impact of the job training programme on comparative participant earnings can be 
difficult to elicit due to the possibility that post-programme earnings can be influenced by unobservable 
participant traits as well as the programme of job training. This may, in turn, introduce a bias in the 
estimation of the mean job training programme effect on programme participant’s earnings. 
 
5
 Such an argument is consistent with, but does not require, the semi-strong form market efficiency 
hypothesis (Fama, 1970). 
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is determined exclusively by decision makers in the capital market (e.g. corporate policy change 
impact on corporation stock market value). In the former case, there is scope for self-selection 
bias, in the latter case there is not.  
Therefore, to invoke a causal interpretation of our matching difference-in-differences test results, 
in respect to dividend initiation events, we can assume selection on observables (Barnow, Cain 
and Goldberger, 1981), as this is the distinct information set available to participants in the capital 
market. Selection on observables is tantamount to the conditional independence assumption, 
which is necessary for causal inference, where the potential outcomes are independent of selection 
to the programme, conditional on observable covariates. 
It is, hence, not our objective to match on the private information held by firm management with 
respect to their decision to initiate a dividend or not to do so. The ‘bias’ to self-select to initiate a 
dividend, due to this private information, is precisely what is revealed to the market in a cash 
dividend pay-out decision or the absence of such a decision. Capital market participants respond 
by making trading decisions based on the new information concerning the firm management’s 
predilection to self-select to initiate a dividend payment. It is the capital market value of the 
private information which is revealed by the event.  
We assume, therefore, that dividend initiating firm and its counterfactual firm is indistinguishable, 
on the basis of publicly available information, prior to the self-selection, on the part of firm 
management, to initiate a cash dividend. The self-selection, to the cash dividend initiation 
announcement, is, hence, an exogenous shock from the perspective of the capital market 
participants, relative to a counterfactual with an identical ex-ante propensity to the cash dividend 
initiation announcement. Our difference-in-differences matching model can elicit the value effect 
of the information content of a cash dividend initiation announcement. 
 
2.1  A New Counterfactual 
In order to estimate the impact of any event it is necessary to operationalise a counterfactual 
scenario. We select a counterfactual by matching on the propensity to the dividend initiation 
event. In doing so, we address a caveat that has plagued the merit of findings in earlier studies, 
which is that of imperfect control-firm matching (Fama, 1998).  
Traditional approaches, in the corporate finance literature on dividend initiations (Michaely, 
Thaler and Womack, 1995, Boehme and Sorescu, 2002 and Bessembinder and Zhang, 2013) to 
approximate the counterfactual scenario match the cash dividend paying firm with a 
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counterfactual firm on certain firm traits (e.g. size, market-to-book and industry sector), but 
neglect to explicitly attempt to account for the propensity to the pay-out event itself. In line with 
the semi-strong form of the efficient market hypothesis (Fama, 1970) investors can have 
expectations, based on publicly available information, on prospective dividend pay-out events, 
which are reflected in price behaviour. Whether the pay-out event is expected to occur is a major 
determinant of expected stock return (Hartzmark and Solomon, 2013) and its neglect can, 
therefore, be a substantial limitation in the construction of an appropriate counterfactual.  
We, hence, avail of a new counterfactual, which explicitly accounts for the estimated propensity, 
based on observable firm characteristics, to a firm to self-select to a pay-out event. Moreover, our 
approach subsumes a dimension-by-dimension matching methodology on the conditioning 
covariates. Many of the covariates which are understood to determine expected returns also have a 
role to play in determining the dividend initiation decisions. As we do not know the propensity 
score specification with certainty we choose to simultaneously conduct ‘balancing score’ tests on 
covariates (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1985, Dehejia and Wahba, 2002, Lechner, 2002, Sianesi 2004, 
and Smith and Todd, 2005). To the extent that these tests are satisfied (see Appendix B), we 
match not solely on the propensity to the dividend initiation event but also on those covariates 
which can explain expected returns. Our principal focus, however, is on the propensity score 
estimation as we assert that we know more about the determination of dividend initiations than we 
do of the process determining stock returns (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1985, and Angrist and 
Kuersteiner, 2007). Our approach to constructing a counterfactual, thus, can subsume the 
economic rationale merit in previously adopted sampling methods while improving on them. It 
conceptually accounts for surprises in initiations, which are likely to be inferred by capital market 
investors.  
Our construction of a new counterfactual satisfies not only conventional matching criteria, but, in 
addition, matches the dividend event firm on the propensities to the actual event.  
In this paper, we adopt nearest neighbour propensity score matching to identify comparable 
counterfactual firms (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983), prior to an announcement of a cash dividend 
payment initiation or omission. We extend Boehme and Sorescu (2002) to re-assess the value 
effects of 2886 cash dividend payment initiations of firms listed on the NYSE or the NASDAQ 
and reporting in United States dollars, from 1972 to 2014. Contrary to the extant literature which 
matches on risk factors, we utilize a matching procedure for the selection of the counterfactual 
firms, where the matching is based on the publicly available information in the capital market.
6
 
                                                          
6
 In order to account for the, ex ante, expectations of investors in the market, we match on the propensity of 
a firm to initiate or omit a payout. This construction of sets of counterfactual firms differs from Michaely, 
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Our counterfactual firms therefore have a comparable, ex ante, propensity to initiate pay outs as 
the firms which actually initiate. In respect to the resulting firms, investors are unable to 
distinguish whether they will initiate. However, as managers can have more information than 
investors, firms with a similar likelihood of a pay-out event, from the perspective of investors, do 
not necessarily exhibit the same incidence of actual payout events. Cash dividend pay-out 
initiation events, which are conducted by management, reveal new information to investors, which 
results in positive value effects after initiations. We compare the stock price changes of firms that 
do initiate (or omit) to those of the firms that do not signal such additional information to the 
market. 
To elicit the value effect of the information content of a cash dividend initiation announcement, 
we, thus, invoke a conditional independence assumption such that the firm which self-selects to 
initiate a cash dividend and its counterfactual have the same – prior to dividend initiation 
announcement – expected value outcomes, conditional on a set of determinants, which can 
influence these outcomes.  
Finally, we adopt a difference-in-differences estimator on stock prices about the cash dividend 
event, in respect to both the dividend initiating and the counterfactual firms. This estimator can 
elicit a consistent estimate of the mean effect of a dividend initiation announcement on the value 
of a dividend initiating firm.  
 
2.2 Accounting for contemporaneous effects 
Our study also incorporates an assessment of the relative importance of cash flow and risk related 
news (Grullon, Michaely and Swaminathan, 2002 and von Eije, Goyal and Muckley, 2014), which 
is realised during the period of measurement of price impact at these dividend events (Grullon, 
Michaely and Swaminathan, 2002, Bulan, Subramanian and Tanlu, 2007, Liu, Szewczyk and 
Zantout, 2008).  
Cross sectional regression analyses of 1st year post-announcement abnormal returns (BHAR; 
CAR) on hypothesized explanatory factors. Liu, Szewczyk and Zantout, 2008 report that (for 
omissions) explanatory factors such as prior dividend yield, the percentage point magnitude of the 
cut, firm size,  the proportion of paying firms, market return, earnings growth and market model 
beta changes, should be accounted for. This specification is informed following prior work; Ghosh 
                                                                                                                                                                              
Thaler and Womack, 1995, Boehme and Sorescu, 2002 and Bessembinder and Zhang, 2013, who do not 




and Woolridge (1988), Christie (1994),  Grullon, Michaelly and Swaminathan (2002), Baker and 
Wurgler (2004). The overall finding is that goodness-of-fit measures and White (1980) corrected 
t-statistics suggest that such factors cannot predict/ explain all economically significant proportion 
of the variation in the one-year announcement returns.  
 
3. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
 
Table 1 shows the return and risk characteristics of dividend (re)initiating firms and dividend 
(re)omitting firms in the year of initiation or omission (1972-2012). Initiating firms are defined as 
firms that pay in a certain year and did not do so in the previous year. This is less strict as in Von 
Eije, Goyal and Muckley (2014), who required also t-2 to be zero and t+1 to be still paying. This 
less demanding screen makes the number of observations larger. Omitting firms are simply firms 
that paid last year, but do not do so this year.     
In Panels A and B, it is evident that the stock returns of initiators and omitting firms are as 
expected. Their mean values are strongly positive for initiators (17.3%) and strongly negative for 
omittors (11.3%).
7
 The direction of the three risk changes; total, systematic and idiosyncratic 
risks, are also as expected for the two groups. The dividend initiation (omission) event is 
associated with a reduction (increase) in risks. Earnings (nitaw) are positive for initiating firms 
and negative for omitting firms, but the net operating cash flows are positive for both groups. In 
Panel C, of the table, the risk changes are shown to be negatively associated with the excess log 




[Please insert table 1 about here.] 
Table 2 shows fiscal year excess returns (and number of observations) during a 5 year period 
around the dividend initiation or omission event.  The set of counterfactual firms for initiator firms 
consists of those that continue not to pay. The set of counterfactual firms for omitting firms 
consists of firms that paid last year and continued paying in the current year. While there are about 
15% more observations on initiating firms than on omitting firms, the number of counterfactuals 
for initiating firms is about 30% larger than for omitting firms. The main result is that there seems 
to be a positive run up before the initiating year for initiating firms and a negative run-up in the 
same period for omitting firms. After the event, the returns for both initiating and omitting firms 
                                                          
7 The similar minimum and maximum of the return observations for treated and omitting firms are caused 
by winsorizing over the full sample. 
8
 Most of the coefficients of correlation are significantly different from 0. 
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are positive. In every time period, the return effects (relative to the simple counterfactuals) are 
significantly larger for both initiating and omitting firms. 
[Please insert table 2 about here.] 
To improve on the adopted counterfactual, used in table 2, we match on the propensity to the 
dividend initiation/ omission event. In Appendix A, the corresponding logit regressions are 
detailed. For omitting firms we show results when lagged earnings were negative.  The regression 
specifications are mainly informed by Von Eije, Goyal and Muckley (2014). In addition to those 
variables, we include possible momentum effects (for two consecutive prior years). We also 
include a variable related to Baker and Wurgler (2004) to capture time varying relevant 
circumstances in market to book ratios, which can determine, according to Baker and Wurgler, the 
likelihood of paying.  Overall, the signs of the variables are similar to those found in Von Eije, 
Goyal and Muckley (2014). The momentum measurement is strongly significant in all regressions. 
The Baker and Wurgler (2004) variable is only significant for the omissions. An important finding 
is that the Pseudo R2 is more than twice as large for omissions than it is for initiations. The higher 
Pseudo R2 suggests that the surprise effect of omissions may be smaller than for initiations.  
 
Table 3 shows the excess log returns in the year of initiation (or omission) and the two 
consecutive years (Treated).
9
  The excess log returns for the counterfactuals (Controls) are also 
reported. The Unmatched results for the controls are all firms that have the relevant observations. 
The NN results for the controls show the returns for the distinct nearest neighbours (i.e. firms that 
have the closest likelihood to initiate/omit based on nearest neighbour matching without 
replacement).  The difference at the NN line gives the estimated effect of the initiation/omission 
measured through the nearest neighbour matching. Using both the unmatched and NN approaches, 
there is a significant difference between treated and controls log returns for time t. The NN 
approach indicates no significant effects of initiations or omissions in time periods t+1 and t+2. 
Turning our focus to the NN results, initiating firms have an excess log return over controls of 
19.1%. Omitting firms have a negative excess log return of 14.1%. For firms with negative lagged 
income the omission effect is in absolute terms smaller. The surprise for omissions with negative 
lagged income would, therefore, appears to be substantively smaller. Furthermore, the absolute 
effect of initiations is larger than that of omissions. This would suggest that there is a greater 
surprise component in initiations than in omissions.  
[Please insert table 3 about here.] 
                                                          
9
 The unmatched results differ from tables 1 and 2, because of the additional requirement that the regressors 
of the logit equation are available as well as the returns for the years t until t+2. 
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Table 4 shows tests of whether there are changes in firm characteristics in the year of (re) 
initiation or (re) omission. This is a further extension of Von Eije, Goyal and Muckley (2014), 
who show significant risk effects for initiators and omittors based on differences-in-differences. 
We extend that work to other variables which can be theoretically (or empirically) linked to 
dividend initiation/ omission event returns. In particular, for stock variables we measure the 
difference in differences (differences over time compared between treated and nearest 
neighbours). For flow variables, we measure differences in the flows between treatment and 
nearest neighbour’s. We find that in the treatment year there are also effects on total, systematic 
and indiosyncratic risk (declining for initiating firms and increasing for omitting firms) and for net 
income to total assets (increasing for initiating firms and declining for omitting firms). Firm size 
differences and capital expenditures are significantly different only for the omitting firms. The 
Baker and Wurgler difference in difference variable is significantly negative for initiating firms.  
 
[Please insert table 4 about here.] 
 
Table 5 shows regression analyses of whether the concomitant differences-in-differences (in stock 
variables) or differences between treated and controls for flow variables influence the initiation 
and omission return effect. It can be the case that these annual returns are impacted principally by 
these firm characteristics rather than the dividend initiation / omission event. We find (Panel A) 
that concomitant differences in net income , the difference in difference of total assets and of the 
Baker and Wurgler variable influence the concomitant returns of initiators and also of the two sets 
of omitting firm returns. The remaining return effects (represented by the constant term) are still 
significant. The remaining return effects of initiating firms (14.3%) remain in absolute terms 
larger than those of omitting firms (10.2%).  
 
[Please insert table 5 about here.] 
 
Panels A – D show our findings in respect to whether the initially measured return effect (dlnretw) 
is robust to the contemporaneous effects we document in table 4. Panels B:D represent variation in 
model specification in respect to risk (total risk instead of aggregate systematic and idiosyncratic 
risks) and net operating cash flows to total assets instead of net income to total assets.  The first 
conclusion based on these calculations and robustness checks is that the annual dividend initiation 
and omission effects are larger than those documented in previous event studies. This suggests 
that there are run-ups in the announcement years (positive for initiations and negative for 
omissions), or post event drift (also positive for initiations and negative for omissions), or that we 
did not capture all contemporaneous effects with the major qualifiers for such effects. The second 
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conclusion is that the annual dividend omission effects are (surprisingly) all smaller than the 
annual dividend initiation effects. The latter might imply that the surprise effect of omissions is 
not as large on an annual basis as might be expected from previous event studies. Such a 
conclusion is also corroborated by the relatively large adjusted R-squareds in the logit regressions 
of omissions in comparison to iniiations, as well as from the fact that the annual omission effects 
of firms with an even higher likelihood to omit (firms with negative last years’ earnings) are never 
even significant.  
 
Table 6 shows the disentanglement of the pure initiation and omission effects from the impact of 
the contemporaneous effects and it also shows which contemporaneous effects have the largest 
impact (Coefdid).  
 
[Please insert table 6 about here.] 
 
For initiating firms and for omitting firms the major contemporaneous effects come from the 
difference in net income between treated and control firms (Coefdid of dnitaw). For omitting 
firms, quite some contemporaneous effects also arise from the increase in idiosyncratic risk 
(Coefdid of ddiriskw) and the decrease in firm size (Coefdid of ddlntaw). The main results remain 
of course (except for rounding errors) unchanged.  
 
A final robustness check is presented in Table 7 (with further information also provided in 
appendices C and D), where we omit all firms that had re-initiations or re-omissions. This sample 
thus contains all pure first initiations and omissions. Also here the major conclusions on relatively 
large annual effects, but smaller absolute annual omission effects hold.  
  





Cash dividend payment initiations and omissions are associated with substantive stock price 
impacts (Michaely, Thaler, and Womack, 1995; Boehme and Sorescu, 2002; Liu, Szewczyk and 
Zantout, 2008). Due to the “the reluctance of managers to reduce dividends” (Michaely, Thaler, 
and Womack, 1995) cash dividend payment omissions are generally expected to have greater 
stock price impact than cash dividend payment initiations. We re-assess the question of whether 
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stock price impacts really differ at extreme cash dividend pay-out events with an annual event 
study. 
Our main findings are fivefold. First, we provide new price impact estimates. We find larger price 
effects during the years of cash dividend initiation and omission than is measured by short period 
event studies. Our propensity score matching (nearest neighbour) difference-in-differences 
findings suggest that the one year price impact of initiations is 19.1% and the one-year price 
decline of dividend omissions is 14.1%. Second, the annual return effects are in absolute terms 
smaller for omissions than for initiations. This suggests that an omission in a certain year is not as 
much a surprise as an initiation. This is also indicated by the pseudo R-squared statistics in our 
logit models are (approximately) twice as large for omission events as for initiation events. Using 
an extended sample of pre- dividend initiation/ omission event publicly available information (von 
Eije, Goyal and Muckley, 2014) there is a significantly higher capacity for investors to predict 
omission than initiation events. Third, we find no price impact after one year has elapsed. Fourth, 
after correction for within same year ‘contemporaneous’ factors, we show that the long run one 
year return impact of initiations is (surprisingly) still larger than that of omissions.  
Our fifth finding is a set of findings in respect to contemporaneous (same year) determinants of 
price effects. We find that the difference-in-differences in systematic risk do not influence 
concurrent returns after initiations or omissions. However, difference-in-differences in total risk is 
relevant. We also find that difference-in-differences in idiosyncratic risk does influence the returns 
after dividend omissions. Finally, income, size and catering effects (Baker and Wurgler, 2004), 
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Table 1 Characteristics of dividend (re)initiating firms and dividend (re)omitting firms in 
the year of initiation (or omission), 1972-2012 
  Panels A and B represent the characteristics for the (re) initiating or (re)omitting firms. Panel C 
shows the coefficients of correlation with the winsorized natural log excess returns during the 
fiscal year (lnretw), dtriskw is the change in winsorized total risk, dsriskw is the change in 
winsorized systematic risk, diriskw is the change in winsorized idiosyncratic risk, nitaw is the 
winsorized ratio of net income to total assets, nocftaw is the winsorized ratio of net cash flow 
from operations (only available from 1985) to total assets. The risk measures are calculated on a 
weekly basis. The winsorizing is done for each variable separtely at 0.5% two-sided. p5, p50 and 






 percentile respectively. 
 lnretw dtriskw dsriskw diriskw nitaw nocftaw 
 Panel A (Re)initiating firms: Dividends paid in the current year, but not in 
the previous year 
Observations 1327 1378 1378 1378 1377 946 
Mean 0.173 -0.005 -0.003 -0.004 0.065 0.102 
Standard deviation 0.467 0.026 0.019 0.023 0.115 0.117 
Minimum -2.174 -0.156 -0.078 -0.144 -1.830 -1.318 
Maximum 1.685 0.156 0.070 0.153 0.305 0.398 
p5 -0.587 -0.046 -0.033 -0.039 -0.048 -0.046 
p50 0.179 -0.005 -0.002 -0.004 0.065 0.105 
p95 0.921 0.034 0.026 0.030 0.199 0.266 
 Panel B (Re)omitting firms: no dividends paid in the current year, but paid 
in the previous year 
Observations 1156 1173 1173 1173 1173 808 
Mean -0.113 0.007 0.002 0.007 -0.045 0.052 
Standard deviation 0.597 0.035 0.021 0.032 0.180 0.123 
Minimum -2.174 -0.186 -0.089 -0.161 -1.830 -1.318 
Maximum 1.685 0.166 0.088 0.174 0.305 0.398 
p5 -1.149 -0.038 -0.030 -0.038 -0.327 -0.098 
p50 -0.091 0.005 0.001 0.004 -0.003 0.058 
p95 0.793 0.066 0.042 0.060 0.123 0.216 
 
Panel C Unconditional coefficients of correlation with the winsorized natural log excess returns 
(lnretw) and the concomitant p=values 
 
Dividend (re)initiating firms (920 
observations) 
Dividend (re)omitting firms (802 
observations) 
 
lnretw p-value lnretw p-value 
dtriskw -0.080 0.015 -0.294 0.000 
dsriskw -0.054 0.101 -0.174 0.000 
diriskw -0.065 0.049 -0.291 0.000 
nitaw 0.234 0.000 0.329 0.000 
nocftaw 0.112 0.001 0.205 0.000 
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Table 2 Fiscal year excess returns during five years around the dividend initiation or the dividend omission, 1972-2012 
  Panel A provides the natural logarithmic excess returns of (re) initiating firms (firms that paid in fiscal year t, but did not in fiscal year  t-1) in comparison to firms that 
continue not to pay in fiscal year t (no payment in both fiscal years t and t-1). Panel B provides the natural logarithmic excess returns of (re)omitting firms (firms that 
paid in fiscal year t-1, but not in fiscal year t) in comparison to firms that continue to pay in fiscal year t.  The t-values refer to the differences in mean values for 
condition 0 respectively 1 with variances assumed to be unequal. t-2 till t+2 refers to fiscal firm-year observations connected to the fiscal firm-year observation in year t. 
 
Number of observations Mean excess returns and t-values of differences 
  t-2 t-1 t t+1 t+2   t-2 t-1 t t+1 t+2 
 
Panel A (Re)initiating firms (=1) versus firms that continue not paying (=0) 
0 32210 37720 37714 32379 28017 0 -0.023 -0.032 -0.040 -0.021 -0.010 
1 1187 1364 1327 1140 1018 1 0.051 0.136 0.173 0.075 0.069 
Total 33397 39084 39041 33519 29035 t-values -4.654 -12.497 -16.056 -6.408 -5.058 
 
 Panel B (Re)omitting firms (=1) versus firms that continue to pay (=0) 
0 24419 26220 26282 24402 22690 0 0.105 0.095 0.079 0.082 0.092 
1 1015 1145 1156 988 869 1 -0.087 -0.241 -0.113 0.037 0.036 






Table 3 Propensity score matching results for (re)initiating and (re)omitting firms 
The mean of the winsorized natural log excess returns (lnretw) of initiating (treated in panel A) 
and omitting (treated in panels B and C) firms are compared to the full group of counterfactual 
firms (Controls) at the Unmatched line and to the firms that are the nearest neighbors (without 
replacement) in the common support region (Controls at the NN line) for the event year (t) and 
two years after the event(t+1 and t+2)., Panel C has –in comparison to panel B- the additional 
requirement that the lagged net income is negative. Diff is the difference between the mean values 
of Treated and Control firms, SE the standard error of the difference and T-stat is the t-statistic of 
the difference.  
time Sample Treated Controls Difference S.E. T-stat 
 
Panel A (Re)initiating firms  
(793 observations with common support) 
t Unmatched 0.202 0.019 0.183 0.022 8.30 
 
NN 0.202 0.011 0.191 0.024 7.94 
t+1 Unmatched 0.087 0.012 0.075 0.022 3.44 
 
NN 0.087 0.062 0.025 0.025 1.01 
t+2 Unmatched 0.059 -0.007 0.067 0.022 3.03 
 NN 0.059 0.055 0.004 0.026 0.16 
 
Panel B (Re)omitting firms  
(705 observations with common support) 
t Unmatched -0.045 0.079 -0.124 0.014 -8.93 
 NN -0.046 0.096 -0.141 0.028 -4.97 
t+1 Unmatched 0.060 0.087 -0.028 0.014 -2.00 
 NN 0.058 0.100 -0.043 0.028 -1.53 
t+2 Unmatched 0.037 0.087 -0.050 0.014 -3.57 
 
NN 0.038 0.046 -0.008 0.027 -0.30 
 
Panel C (Re)omitting firms with lagged negative income  
(381 observations with common support) 
t Unmatched -0.011 0.015 -0.027 0.028 -0.96 
 NN -0.047 0.021 -0.068 0.040 -1.68 
t+1 Unmatched 0.092 0.080 0.012 0.026 0.45 
 NN 0.094 0.110 -0.016 0.038 -0.42 
t+2 Unmatched 0.053 0.059 -0.006 0.027 -0.23 
 





Table 4 Fiscal year changes in firm characteristics in the year of (re)initiation or 
(re)omission, 1972-2012 
The change in characteristics of initiating (Treated in panel A) and omitting (Treated in panels B and C) 
firms are compared to the firms that are the nearest neighbors (without replacement) in the common support 
region (Controls) during the year of the initiation or omission. Panel C has –in comparison to panel B- the 
additional requirement that the lagged net income is negative. lnretw is the winsorized natural log excess 
returns, dtriskw is the change in total risk, dsrisk is the change in systematic risk, dirisk is the change in 
idiosyncratic risk, nita is net income to total assets, capexta are the capital expenditures to total assets, dlnta 
is the change in the natural log of total assets, drete is the change in the ratio of retained earnings to total 
equity, and dbwmean is the change in the ratio of the mean annual winsorized market to book values of  
payers divided by similar values for non-payers. The risk measures are calculated on a weekly basis. All 
variables are winsorized at 0.5% two-sided (indicated by the letter “w” at the end of the mnemonic. Diff is 
the difference between the mean values of Treated and Control firms. T-stat is the t-statistic of the 
difference. 
 Treated Controls Difference T-stat 
 (Re)initiating firms (1122 observations) 
lnretw 0.192 0.002 0.191 9.29 
dtriskw -0.006 0.000 -0.006 -5.29 
dsriskw -0.003 0.000 -0.004 -4.88 
diriskw -0.004 0.000 -0.004 -4.25 
nitaw 0.064 0.028 0.036 6.32 
capextaw 0.060 0.062 -0.002 -0.69 
dlntaw 0.099 0.102 -0.003 -0.26 
dretew 0.035 -0.028 0.063 0.38 
dbwmean -0.017 0.001 -0.018 -2.44 
 
(Re)omitting firms (973 observations) 
lnretw -0.108 0.094 -0.203 -8.24 
dtriskw 0.008 -0.003 0.011 7.61 
dsriskw 0.003 -0.003 0.006 6.38 
diriskw 0.007 -0.002 0.009 6.87 
nitaw -0.048 0.008 -0.057 -8.44 
capextaw 0.046 0.056 -0.009 -3.95 
dlntaw -0.032 0.021 -0.053 -4.85 
dretew 0.102 -0.009 0.111 0.77 
dbwmean -0.006 -0.008 0.001 0.13 
 
(Re)omitting firms with negative income (559 observations) 
lnretw -0.117 0.015 -0.132 -3.79 
dtriskw 0.010 0.001 0.009 4.42 
dsriskw 0.003 -0.001 0.005 3.51 
diriskw 0.010 0.002 0.008 4.17 
nitaw -0.088 -0.018 -0.071 -6.90 
capextaw 0.039 0.048 -0.009 -3.55 
dlntaw -0.118 -0.033 -0.086 -6.41 
dretew 0.014 -0.160 0.174 0.63 





Table 5 Regression analysis of differences in differences for (re)initiating and (re)omitting 
firms, 1972-2012 
   The dependent variable is the difference of the current winsorized fiscal year natural log-return between 
treated (initiating in Panel A and omitting  in Panel B) firms and that of their nearest neighbors. dsrisk is the 
change in systematic risk, dirisk is the change in idiosyncratic risk, nita is net income to total assets, nocfta 
is the net cash flow from operations (only available from 1985), capexta are the capital expenditures to total 
assets, dlnta is the change in the natural log of total assets, drete is the change in the ratio of retained 
earnings to total equity, and dbwmean is the change in the ratio of the mean annual winsorized market to 
book values of  payers divided by similar values for non-payers.. All independent variables are the 
differences (indicated by the letter “d” in front of the mnemonic) between the winsorized treated variables 
and their winsorized nearest neighbor variables. The risk measures are calculated on a weekly basis. The 
winsorizing of the variables of treated and control firms is indicated by the letter “w” at the end of the 
mnemonic. The t-values (t) and p-values (P>t) are based on robust standard errors. The constant term is the 
average annual return effect of the treatment after correction for contemporaneous changes.. 
Panel A Difference in difference regressions with systematic and idiosyncratic risk and the ratio 
of net income to total assets 
 
(Re)initiations (Re)omissions (Re)omissions for firms with 
negative lagged income 
 Coef P>t Coef P>t Coef P>t 
ddsriskw -0.834 0.357 0.226 0.810 0.725 0.556 
ddiriskw -1.180 0.166 -3.298 0.000 -3.180 0.000 
dnitaw 0.896 0.000 0.908 0.000 0.793 0.000 
ddlntaw 0.297 0.000 0.355 0.000 0.309 0.008 
dcapextaw -0.401 0.097 0.104 0.746 -0.283 0.536 
ddretew -0.005 0.263 0.008 0.298 0.006 0.184 
ddbwmean -0.408 0.000 -0.586 0.000 -0.582 0.000 














Panel B Difference in difference regressions with total risk and the ratio of net income to total 
assets 
 
(Re)initiations (Re)omissions (Re)omissions for firms with 
negative lagged income 
 Coef P>t Coef P>t Coef P>t 
ddtriskw -1.436 0.033 -1.946 0.027 -1.329 0.280 
dnitaw 0.894 0.000 0.976 0.000 0.869 0.000 
ddlntaw 0.296 0.000 0.374 0.000 0.322 0.007 
dcapextaw -0.398 0.099 0.134 0.680 -0.280 0.538 
ddretew -0.005 0.264 0.007 0.401 0.005 0.266 
ddbwmean -0.409 0.000 -0.575 0.000 -0.582 0.000 













 To be continued 
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Table 5 continued 
Panel C Difference in difference regressions with systematic and idiosyncratic risk 
and the ratio of net operating cash flows to total assets 
 
(Re)initiations (Re)omissions (Re)omissions for 
firms with negative 
lagged income 
 Coef P>t Coef P>t Coef P>t 
ddsriskw -1.355 0.251 -0.708 0.609 0.332 0.856 
ddiriskw -2.062 0.062 -4.100 0.000 -4.473 0.000 
dnocftaw 0.316 0.129 0.506 0.056 0.234 0.355 
ddlntaw 0.426 0.000 0.580 0.000 0.523 0.001 
dcapextaw -0.813 0.007 0.091 0.833 0.045 0.958 
ddretew -0.003 0.584 0.008 0.360 0.009 0.115 
dbwmean -0.142 0.302 -1.071 0.000 -0.901 0.002 













        
Panel D Difference in difference regressions with total risk and the ratio of net 
operating cash flows to total assets 
 
(Re)initiations (Re)omissions (Re)omissions for 
firms with negative 
lagged income 
 Coef P>t Coef P>t Coef P>t 
ddtriskw -2.342 0.006 -3.736 0.002 -2.660 0.112 
dnocftaw 0.292 0.157 0.466 0.082 0.205 0.429 
ddlntaw 0.418 0.000 0.626 0.000 0.558 0.001 
dcapextaw -0.776 0.009 0.399 0.356 0.231 0.767 
ddretew -0.002 0.617 0.004 0.624 0.007 0.285 
ddbwmean -0.304 0.006 -0.774 0.000 -0.830 0.000 
















Table 6 The relative impact of the concomitant annual differences in differences during the year of (re)intiating  or (re)omitting, 1972-2012  
The table presents the impact of the changes in the difference in differences of firm characteristics during the event year on the impact of the annual excess returns  
applied to the regression estimates of Table 6, panel A.. dsrisk is the change in systematic risk, dirisk is the change in idiosyncratic risk, nita is net income to total assets, 
nocfta is the net cash flow from operations (only available from 1985), capexta are the capital expenditures to total assets, dlnta is the change in the natural log of total 
assets, drete is the change in the ratio of retained earnings to total equity, and dbwmean is the change in the ratio of the mean annual winsorized market to book values of  
payers divided by similar values for non-payers The risk measures are calculated on a weekly basis.. The dependent variable is the difference of the current winsorized 
fiscal year natural log-return between treated (initiating in Panel A and omitting  in Panels B and C) firms and that of their nearest neighbors. The difference between the 
winsorized (indicated by the letter “w” at the end of the mnemonic) between the treated variables and their winsorized nearest neighbor variables are indicated by the 
letter “d” in front of the mnemonic. Coef is the coefficient of the regression equation (Table 6, panel A), DID is the difference in difference of the firms characteristics in 
the year of the treatment between treated firms and their nearest neighbor in the propensity score matching based on the logit regressions of Appendix A. Coefdid is the 
multiplication of the coefficients by the DIDs. Except for rounding errors the constant term of the regression equation(Constant) equals the estimated difference in 
differences in firm excess returns(dlnretw) minus the sum of the multiplication of the coefficients with the concomitant average difference in differences (Sum of 
Coefdid).  
 (Re)initiating firms (Re)omitting firms 
(Re)omitting firms with negative 
lagged income 
 
Coef DID Coefdid Coef DID Coefdid Coef DID Coefdid 
ddsriskw -0.834 -0.004 0.003 0.226 0.006 0.001 0.725 0.005 0.004 
ddiriskw -1.180 -0.004 0.005 -3.298 0.009 -0.030 -3.180 0.008 -0.025 
dnitaw 0.896 0.036 0.032 0.908 -0.057 -0.052 0.793 -0.071 -0.056 
ddlntaw 0.297 -0.003 -0.001 0.355 -0.053 -0.019 0.309 -0.086 -0.027 
dcapextaw -0.401 -0.002 0.001 0.104 -0.009 -0.001 -0.283 -0.009 0.003 
ddretew -0.005 0.063 0.000 0.008 0.111 0.001 0.006 0.174 0.001 
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Table 7 Robustness checks for differences in differences for first initiating and first omitting 
firms, 1972-2012 
   The dependent variable is the difference of the current winsorized fiscal year natural log-return between 
treated (initiating in Panel A and omitting  in Panel B) firms and that of their nearest neighbors. dsrisk is the 
change in systematic risk, dirisk is the change in idiosyncratic risk, nita is net income to total assets, nocfta 
is the net cash flow from operations (only available from 1985), capexta are the capital expenditures to total 
assets, dlnta is the change in the natural log of total assets, drete is the change in the ratio of retained 
earnings to total equity, and dbwmean is the change in the ratio of the mean annual winsorized market to 
book values of  payers divided by similar values for non-payers.  The risk measures are calculated on a 
weekly basis. All independent variables are the differences (indicated by the letter “d” in front of the 
mnemonic) between the winsorized treated variables and their winsorized nearest neighbor variables. The 
winsorizing of the variables of treated and control firms is indicated by the letter “w” at the end of the 
mnemonic. The t-values (t) and p-values (P>t) are based on robust standard errors. The constant term is the 
average annual return effect of the treatment after correction for contemporaneous changes Coefdid is the 
multiplication of the coefficients by the DIDs. Except for rounding errors the constant term of the regression 
equation(Constant) equals the estimated difference in differences in firm excess returns(dlnretw) minus the 
sum of the multiplication of the coefficients with the concomitant average difference in differences (Sum of 
Coefdid). 
Difference in difference regressions with systematic and idiosyncratic risk and the ratio of net 
income to total assets 
 First initiating firms First omitting firms 
 Coef P>t Coefdid Coef P>t Coefdid 
ddsriskw -3.808 0.000 0.020 -0.100 0.919 -0.001 
ddiriskw -0.545 0.526 0.003 -3.127 0.000 -0.029 
dnitaw 0.961 0.000 0.040 1.111 0.000 -0.066 
ddlntaw 0.354 0.000 -0.001 0.168 0.078 -0.002 
dcapextaw 0.016 0.947 0.000 -0.074 0.808 0.004 
ddretew -0.006 0.115 -0.001 0.007 0.249 0.001 
ddbwmean -0.303 0.001 0.010 -0.535 0.000 0.004 
Constant 0.138 0.000  -0.114 0.000  
Observations 956   822   
R
2
 0.178   0.212   
Sum of Coefdid   0.070   -0.088 





Appendix A Logit equations for initiations and omissions 
The dependent variable of columns 1 and 2 is a dummy that represents initiating firms (dummy=1) 
compared to the firms that do not initiate (dummy=0), and in columns 3 till 6 the omitting firms (dummy=1) 
compared to the firms that continue to pay (dummy=0). Columns 5 and 6 differ from columns 3 and 4 
because of the addition of the requirement that the ratio of net income to total assets is negative in the 
previous year. lnret is the fiscal year return, trisk is the standard deviation of weekly return risk for a fiscal 
year, lnta is the natural log of total assets,  rete is the retained earnings to total equity, nita is net income to 
total assets, data is the relative change in total assets, mtb is the market to book value of equity, ltdta is long 
term debt divided by total assets, cata is the cash and near cash divided by total assets, sdnita is the three 
year standard deiviation of the ratio of net income to total assets, ipoage is the age of the firm measured snce 
the IPO-year, divdurl is the lagged uninterrupted duration of the dividend payment in years, bwmean is the 
ratio of the mean annual winsorized market to book values of  payers divided by similar values for non-
payers. t is time and t2 is time squared. Constant is the constant term of the logit equation. The regressions 
contain 1-digit industry dummies (not reported). All financial variables are winsorized at 0.5% two-sided 
sided (except bwmeanl which is already based on winsorized variables) and lagged (indicated by the letters 
“w” and “l” at the end of the mnemonic, and l2 if two year lagged).Coef is the coefficient of thelogit 
equation and P>z indicates the significance of the z-value. 
 
 (Re)initiating firms (Re)omitting firms 
 (Re)omitting firms 
with negative lagged 
income 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
 Coef P>z Coef P>z Coef P>z 
l2lnretw 0.135 0.028 -0.628 0.000 -0.783 0.000 
l1lnretw 0.548 0.000 -1.170 0.000 -1.231 0.000 
triskwl -7.625 0.000 18.760 0.000 17.275 0.000 
lntawl 0.073 0.002 -0.311 0.000 -0.293 0.000 
retewl 0.025 0.050 -0.046 0.083 -0.038 0.159 
nitawl 4.538 0.000 -8.715 0.000 -5.980 0.000 
datawl -0.758 0.000 0.367 0.005 0.626 0.002 
mtbwl -0.020 0.071 0.040 0.005 0.011 0.665 
ltdtawl -0.453 0.028 1.837 0.000 0.347 0.346 
catawl 0.359 0.060 0.300 0.363 -1.168 0.051 
sdnitawl -1.384 0.002 2.422 0.000 -6.388 0.000 
ipoage 0.013 0.001 0.024 0.000 0.016 0.056 
divdurl 
  
-0.093 0.000 -0.056 0.000 
bwmeanl 0.241 0.314 -1.017 0.000 -1.177 0.003 
t1 -0.332 0.000 0.145 0.000 -0.052 0.230 
t2 0.004 0.000 -0.002 0.000 0.000 0.581 
Constant 2.749 0.000 -4.011 0.000 1.881 0.056 
       
Observations 33052  24381  2269  
Pseudo R2 0.121  0.297  0.241  
Chi-squared test 0.000  0.000  0.000  
Events 1169  992  573  





Appendix B Tests on common mean characteristics of treated and counterfactual firms for variables used in the logit analyses 
  The results are based on the propensity score matches for the relevant variables. lnret is the fiscal year return, trisk is the standard deviation of weekly return for a fiscal 
year, lnta is the natural log of total assets,  rete is the retained earnings to total equity, nita is net income to total assets, data is the relative change in total assets, mtb is the 
market to book value of equity, ltdta is long term debt divided by total assets, cata is the cash and near cash divided by total assets, sdnita is the three year standard 
deviation of the ratio of net income to total assets, ipoage is the age of the firm measured since the IPO-year,  bwmean is the ratio of the mean annual winsorized market 
to book values of  payers divided by similar values for non-payers, divdurl is the lagged uninterrupted duration of the dividend payment in years, t is time and t2 is time 
squared. All financial variables are winsorized at 0.5% two-sided (except lbwmean which is already based on winsorized variables) and lagged (indicated by the letters 
“w” and “l” at the end of the mnemonic, and l2 if two year lagged).Treated are the initiating or omitting firms, Controls are the concomitant counterfactual observations, 
Difference is the difference between the means of the treated and control variables, and t-stat is the t-statistic of the difference. 
 
(Re)initiating firms (Re)omitting firms (Re)omitting firms with negative lagged 
income 
 
Treated Controls Difference T-stat Treated Controls Difference T-stat Treated Controls Difference T-stat 
lnretwl2 0.055 0.048 0.007 0.31 -0.093 -0.094 0.001 0.05 -0.189 -0.145 -0.043 -1.70 
lnretwl 0.143 0.137 0.005 0.26 -0.244 -0.209 -0.035 -1.41 -0.402 -0.285 -0.117 -3.75 
triskwl 0.070 0.070 0.000 0.21 0.075 0.072 0.002 1.64 0.078 0.070 0.008 4.32 
lntawl 5.192 5.200 -0.009 -0.11 5.256 5.092 0.164 2.25 5.377 5.393 -0.016 -0.17 
retewl 0.265 0.224 0.041 0.32 0.174 0.374 -0.200 -1.86 0.121 0.272 -0.150 -0.92 
nitawl 0.054 0.051 0.003 0.58 -0.033 -0.010 -0.023 -3.84 -0.103 -0.078 -0.025 -3.06 
datawl 0.122 0.127 -0.005 -0.47 0.056 0.065 -0.009 -0.53 -0.021 -0.008 -0.014 -0.65 
mtbwl 2.125 2.102 0.023 0.16 1.728 1.815 -0.087 -0.55 1.209 1.036 0.173 1.10 
ltdtawl 0.167 0.165 0.003 0.36 0.233 0.233 -0.001 -0.07 0.246 0.237 0.009 0.78 
catawl 0.170 0.161 0.009 1.14 0.103 0.109 -0.006 -0.88 0.077 0.077 0.000 -0.06 
sdnitawl 0.054 0.053 0.001 0.15 0.073 0.064 0.009 2.12 0.088 0.077 0.011 2.12 
ipoage 13.471 13.389 0.081 0.22 15.373 15.151 0.222 0.49 16.297 16.138 0.159 0.26 
bwmeanl 1.074 1.078 -0.004 -0.54 1.057 1.049 0.008 1.00 1.064 1.051 0.014 1.33 
divdurl 
    
6.882 6.053 0.828 2.88 8.376 8.560 -0.184 -0.42 
t1 35.873 35.831 0.042 0.08 34.479 34.686 -0.207 -0.43 33.631 33.435 0.197 0.32 
t2 1442.6 1443.4 -0.864 -0.02 1304.0 1312.2 -8.182 -0.25 1243.7 1218.4 25.306 0.60 
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Appendix C The differences between the treated and control firms for first initiating and first 
omitting firms, 1972-2012 
  lnret is the fiscal year return, (d)trisk is the (change in the) standard deviation of weekly return for a fiscal year, 
(d)lnta is the (change in the) natural log of total assets,  (d)rete is the(change in the) retained earnings to total 
equity, nita is net income to total assets, data is the relative change in total assets, mtb is the market to book 
value of equity, ltdta is long term debt divided by total assets, cata is the cash and near cash divided by total 
assets, sdnita is the three year standard deviation of the ratio of net income to total assets, ipoage is the age of 
the firm measured since the IPO-year, (d)bwmean is the (change in the) lagged ratio of the mean annual 
winsorized market to book values of payers divided by similar values for non-payers, divdur is the lagged 
uninterrupted duration of the dividend payment in years, t is time and t2 is time squared. All financial variables 
are winsorized at 0.5% two-sided (except bwmean which is already based on winsorized variables) and lagged 
(indicated by the letters “w” and “l” at the end of the mnemonic, and l2 if two year lagged).Treat are the 
initiating or omitting firms, Contr are the concomitant counterfactual observations, DID is the difference 
between the means of the treated and control variables, and T-stat is the t-statistic of the DID. 
 
First initiating firms First omitting firms 
Variable Treat Contr DID T-stat Treat Contr DID T-stat 
 PanelA Variables used in the logit equations 
lnretwl2 0.064 0.066 -0.002 -0.06 -0.113 -0.106 -0.007 -0.3 
lnretwl 0.131 0.138 -0.008 -0.34 -0.267 -0.259 -0.008 -0.29 
triskwl 0.070 0.070 0.001 0.48 0.075 0.074 0.001 0.86 
lntawl 5.168 5.175 -0.006 -0.08 5.292 5.187 0.106 1.33 
retewl 0.207 0.098 0.109 0.86 0.117 0.394 -0.277 -2.14 
nitawl 0.054 0.044 0.010 1.54 -0.038 -0.018 -0.020 -2.87 
datawl 0.128 0.111 0.017 1.48 0.057 0.079 -0.023 -1.17 
mtbwl 2.217 2.279 -0.063 -0.39 1.705 1.871 -0.166 -0.96 
ltdtawl 0.165 0.166 -0.001 -0.15 0.239 0.238 0.001 0.14 
catawl 0.171 0.171 -0.001 -0.08 0.104 0.106 -0.003 -0.38 
sdnitawl 0.053 0.055 -0.001 -0.35 0.076 0.068 0.009 1.71 
ipoage 12.140 11.945 0.196 0.57 14.015 13.258 0.757 1.75 
bwmeanl 1.081 1.070 0.011 1.43 1.062 1.055 0.007 0.76 
divdurl 
   
0.83 7.321 6.562 0.759 2.23 
t1 35.167 34.686 0.481 0.88 33.962 33.934 0.028 0.05 
t2 1395.4 1361.8 33.6 9.2 1268.2 1265.1 3.2 0.09 
 Panel B Contemporaneous changes  
lnretw 0.200 -0.009 0.209 -6.38 -0.110 0.104 -0.213 -7.68 
dtriskw -0.005 0.002 -0.007 -6.33 0.009 -0.003 0.012 6.97 
dsriskw -0.004 0.002 -0.005 -4.83 0.003 -0.003 0.006 5.93 
diriskw -0.004 0.001 -0.005 6.27 0.008 -0.001 0.009 6.26 
nitaw 0.063 0.022 0.041 -1.45 -0.049 0.011 -0.060 -7.92 
capextaw 0.061 0.066 -0.004 -0.16 0.046 0.058 -0.013 -4.78 
dlntaw 0.107 0.109 -0.002 1.06 -0.043 0.013 -0.056 -4.77 
dretew 0.074 -0.116 0.190 -4.13 0.152 -0.053 0.205 1.21 
dbwmean -0.019 0.014 -0.033 
 




Appendix D The results for initiations if the requirement is set that it is the first initiation 
announcement since 1959  and that data are available in our dataset 
 
Regression 




treated controls Diff T-val  
ddsriskw 0.316 0.904 
 
-0.005 -0.001 -0.005 -2.97 -0.001 
ddiriskw -1.148 0.544 
 
-0.005 -0.002 -0.003 -1.5 0.003 
dnitaw 2.012 0.000 
 
0.075 0.052 0.023 3 0.047 
ddlntaw 0.031 0.882 
 
0.110 0.107 0.003 0.18 0.000 
dcapextaw -0.025 0.970 
 
0.068 0.065 0.002 0.44 0.000 
ddretew -0.037 0.304 
 
0.093 -0.174 0.268 1.45 -0.010 
ddbwmean -0.757 0.000 
 
-0.057 -0.003 -0.054 -3.46 0.041 
_cons 0.099 0.092 
      R2 0.279        
Observations 109     259   
lnretw 
   
0.179 0.023 0.156 4.14 
 Sum Coefdif 
       
0.079 
 
 
